and the "misrecognition of temporality" (2009, p. 16) , this essay turns to Ferenczi's writings. In his works, time is neither ignored, nor murdered, nor misrecognised; instead, it is woven into a pluralistic meta-construction. His writings avoid the psychoanalytic fascination with the idea of timelessness that arises from a consideration of the atemporal aspects of the psyche and the atemporal nature of the drive. captivated by this "timeless time," one can miss the qualitatively different threads of time that organise the psychoanalytic encounter.
Ferenczi's contributions to psychoanalytic technique have variously been discussed by reference to notions of active technique, elasticity, mutuality, and tact. What holds these contributions together, however, is precisely Ferenczi's unique approach to time and, in particular, his capacity to consider the mythological, historical, and intersubjective dimensions of time. In what follows, in a search for a good enough metaphor, I identify three threads of time: a tangent, a segment, and a meandering line. each corresponds to a Ferenczian time: originary time, organic time, and pulsating time.
First Thread: Originary Time or the Tangent-Out
Ferenczi's originary time is his most daring but also his most obscure. Its opacity grows out of the very history of psychoanalysis; in particular, it grows out of early efforts at demarcating psychoanalysis from occultism and spiritualism, and at institutionalising it as a science. In his 1933 obituary of Ferenczi, the english psychoanalyst and psychical researcher John Rickman described him as "one of the most adventurous speculative researchers" of the Society of Psychical Research, of which they both had been members (p. 124). Indeed, Ferenczi had tried out automatic writing; he had organised telepathy experiments with Frau Seidler, a Berlin divinatory, and with Frau Jelinek, a Hungarian somnambulist (Gyimesi, 2012) ; and he had followed closely for eight years the mystical investigations of elizabeth Severn, who was perhaps his most important patient and with whom he developed his ideas on mutuality. one of his first publications, an essay on spiritism, carries an uninhibited expression of his early monistic disposition, as Ferenczi writes:
In the present state of our culture most of the educated imbibe in school the principles of atomic materialism. The world consists of an infinite mass of indivisible particles of various sizes whose vibrations produce light, warmth, electricity, and so forth. consciousness itself is a product of masses of brain material. our physics instructor found it easy to talk of all this with full conviction. From his point of view everything was very simple. There were 60-70 different atoms (since then we have 10 more), 8-10 different kinds of other vibrations; this was the essence of the universe. He who spoke of uniexistence, soul or metaphysics was a fool. (1899/1963, p. 140) Material classifications and the scientism of his era left Ferenczi unconvinced and quite curious about exploring uniexistence, even before encountering Freud and Freudian psychoanalysis. later, his monistic disposition, as well as his interest in telepathy and thought transference, filtered through the scientific project of psychoanalysis.
Ferenczi, not without enthusiasm, shared with Freud that he had established a series of connections between telepathy and transference. as he playfully wrote to Freud on November 22, 1910 , during his next visit to Vienna he would introduce himself as "court astrologer of the psychoanalysts" (in Brabant, Falzeder, & Giampieri-Deutsch, eds., 1993, pp. 235-236) . In his response the following month, Freud explicitly asked him to postpone the publication of his conclusions for three years. 2 In fact, Ferenczi never published his thoughts on telepathy from that period. Throughout the years, he remained reserved in elucidating the relationship between telepathic thought transference (Gedankenübertragung), intergenerational transmission (Übertragung), and transference (Übertragung It is possible that here we are facing a fourth 'narcissistic wound' namely that even the intelligence of which we are so proud, though analysts, is not our property but must be replaced or regenerated through the rhythmic outpouring of the ego into the universe, which alone is all knowing and therefore intelligent. But more of this another time. (1932/1995, p. 33, emphasis added) This fragment was written in Ferenczi's last year of life and little opportunity remained to elucidate this striking proposition. The monistic and non-materialistic traces of his thought closed a circle that started with "uniexistence" and led up to "the rhythmic outpouring of the ego into the universe." Ferenczi's Thalassa (1924 /1938 , in which he developed a series of ontogenetic-phylogenetic analogies, marked his most adventurous experiment with originary time. only through analogy, not through chronology, could one grasp originary time. It could not even be elucidated as regression from present to past. Instead, originary time appeared as a tangent of the lived present. This tangent-out might be imagined as a line of highly accelerated travel touching two temporal periods in which two series of elements stand in similar relations to one another. analogical thinking meant sustaining contact with both series of elements, as a tangent touches on two circles.
as Deleuze (1985) argues, originary time must be understood as the most complicated state. chiefly due to its undifferentiation, it is not broken apart or developed into a series of dimensions, but rather falls back to the birth of the world (see Pelbart, 2010, p. 10) . In Thalassa the tangent crosses between the "intrauterine existence of higher mammals" and their "aboriginal piscine period" in which the "relations" of the elements to each other are marked by post-catastrophic emergence (1924/1938, p. 45) . For Ferenczi, adaptation and creativity were post-catastrophic events, or as he explained: "birth itself [is] nothing but a recapitulation on the part of the individual of the great catastrophe which at the time of the recession of the ocean forced so many animals, and certainly our own animal ancestors, to adapt themselves to land existence" (p. 45). Moving between ontogenesis and phylogenesis, Ferenczi elucidates elements in the series of post-catastrophic emergence:
The possession of an organ of copulation, the development within the maternal womb, and the circumvention of the great danger of desiccation-these three thus form an indestructible biological unity which must constitute the ultimate basis of the symbolic identity of the womb with the sea and the earth on the one hand, and of the male member with the child and the fish on the other. (p. 50)
Ferenczi's analogical thinking differs from the Saussurean division of the sign into the material signifier (the word) and the conceptual signified (the thing referred to by the sound). For Ferenczi, things have meaning in their immediate materiality. Meaning is not detached, abstracted, or located elsewhere. Materiality is not a lower order that entraps us, while semantic fullness remains the horizon toward which we aspire: "the symbol-a thing of flesh and blood," he writes in a 1921 essay, perhaps with the ink of a poet (1921a/1994, p. 352) . Here Ferenczi's analogical thinking shares ground with Félix Guattari's semiotics. Guattari writes:
There is no language in itself. What specifies human language is precisely that it never refers back to itself, it always remains open to all other modes of semiotization. (2011, p. 27) Ferenczian semiotics differentiates unsubstantial allegory from the symbol (see 1913/1994, p. 280) . Not every analogy is symbolic in a psychoanalytic sense. First, it has a physiological basis; it "expresses in some ways the whole body or its functions" (1921a/1994, p. 355) . Second, one of the two terms of an analogy that can be considered symbolic-a thing, an idea-is invested in consciousness with inexplicable, overcharged affect. This surplus of affect derives from unconscious identification with another thing or idea to which it actually belongs. This analogical thinking allows Ferenczi in Thalassa to move quite freely from smaller to greater catastrophes, and to draw a tangent to originary times. 3 When Ferenczi distinguishes between unsubstantial analogy and symbolic analogy, he contrasts the two-dimensionality of the former with the three-dimensionality of the latter. What comprises the third dimension? It is the analogical trip of the mind/body of the analyst that connects two series of elements that bear a homology, where one series is invested with overcharged affect. Where the split between two areas of the psyche was-or where the split between the body and the mind was-a tangent of elucidation is drawn, and with it, a new subject emerges, one capable of sustaining the experience of the symbol as a thing of flesh and blood.
Ferenczi's notes on analogical thinking, as well as his more disparate notes on uniexistence, bring us to complications of the analyst's plural being in time. Those complications prevent us from reducing the analyst's mentality to a timelessness in which the attention fluctuates in reverie, beyond the demands of Kronos. Thomas ogden (1997) describes conscious reverie as one of the analyst's mental states during a session. He recognizes its roles in the elucidation of the unconscious experience of the patient, as he explains: "Reverie is a principal form of re-presentation of the unconscious (largely intersubjective) experience of analyst and analysand. The analytic use of reverie is the process by which unconscious experience is made into verbally symbolic metaphors that re-present unconscious aspects of ourselves to ourselves" (p. 727). But Ferenczi would here object to the centrality of linguistic symbols. Words, too, can be bound to unsubstantial allegory, just as things can comprise the heart of symbols.
Similarly, Ferenczi's tangential temporality cannot be equated with enigmatic regression to originary times. césar and Sára Botella (2005) , for example, describe through the notion of "figurability" a state of mind in the analyst akin to the night dream. Figurability is predicated on ''the existence of a capacity of the psyche to create a sensorial quality from a singular and complex unconscious process'' (p. 10). The ana-lyst, they argue, must allow for a state of "formal regression" (p. 47), as floating attention no longer suffices to access what lies beyond the mnemic trace. a Ferenczian figurability, however, would not merely fluctuate or reach backwards to the past, but manage to touch upon two temporalities at once, and to keep that double contact while elucidating the overcharge of affect in one of them. 4 Bion's metaphorical image of suspended, unfocused attention, paradoxically both effortless and purposeful, resonates with Ferenczi's analogical thought. Bion (1970) describes this mental state as "a positive act of refraining from both memory and desire" (p. 31). Ferenczi's analogical thinking-his own positive act of reframing-is, however, sharper. It is expressed in the grammar: this set of relations in this temporality is akin to the other set of relations in the other temporality. This grammar lies at the core of symbolization. Such verbalized metaphors or symbols work in the session as a true "third object" (Winnicott, 1971; J. Benjamin, 1988) between the analyst and the analysand, creating, in Birksted-Breen's (2012) words, "an 'other' or 'otherness' that does not produce intolerable jealousy" (p. 827) and that allows a "re-libidinalisation of the analysis" (p. 828). In this way, analogical thinking creates an internal thirdness also within the analyst, where both interpretive work and theoretical elaboration can take place.
There remains, of course, an omnipresent possibility of interruption. Keeping to Ferenczi's account of the symbolic, we can always slip in and out of our words, or we can stumble over our things. The genesis of these interruptions is in the originary catastrophe itself, which can reverberate in smaller catastrophes. It is worth noting that, unlike lacan's "coups" (1988), the analyst does not orchestrate these interruptions merely to produce interpretative results for the patient. Instead, the interruptions reflect the internal experience of the analyst who is unafraid of slipping or stumbling. In the process of being interrupted, something very particular happens for Ferenczi: we enter a type of post-catastrophic mode that is more prone to creativity. To keep to our visual metaphor, an interrupted tangent becomes open for symbolization and elucidates in a fuller way the two terms of an analogy.
Second Thread: Organic Time or the Segment
Segmentation, or sequence, defines Ferenczi's second temporal thread. It acknowledges the finite nature of psychoanalytic cure: not only must every analysis end, but also each analysis must limit itself to the shortest time that can be productive for the patient (see arlow, 1986; Hartocollis, 2003; and Sabbadini, 1989 ). Further, not only is the finitude of the talking cure at issue, but also the finitude of the analyst and the analysand. What emerges from a series of Ferenczian writings on technique is a sense of self-limitation, one that flows from observing the phases of an organism's birth, maturation, and death. This temporal disposition I call organic time.
an affinity exists between Ferenczi's organic time and the idea of progressive development in the english school of psychoanalysis. as we see in Winnicott, emotional development occurs in successive phases. as such, the temporality of analysis becomes one of delayed action, of waiting, of continuous duration (Gondar, 2006) . Ferenczi, however, places emphasis on segmentation, on breaking apart the treatment into elemental phases and locating oneself in its unfolding, from the beginning of the cure to its final stages. But Ferenczi does not confine himself to noting the beginning, middle, and end; he posits a phased theory of transference and countertransference, and classifies the analyst's mental actions in each segment. In Ferenczi's words, this amounts to a "metapsychology of the analyst's mental process during analysis" (1928/1994, p. 98) . Transference and countertransference divide into different phases, each linked with a series of anticipations on the part of the analyst. This sense of organicity is a manifestation of libido, both of the analysand and the analyst, and Ferenczi produces a true laboratory for discerning the movements of both libidos during the separate phases of the analytic cure.
In "on the Technique of Psychoanalysis, " Ferenczi (1919 " Ferenczi ( /1994 leads us through the phases of countertransference. Using the image of a "honeymoon of the analysis," he argues that in the first phase one is miles from considering, let alone mastering, the counter-transference. one yields to every affect that the doctor-patient relationship might evoke, is moved by the patient's sad experiences, probably, too, by his phantasies, and is indignant with all those who wish him ill. In a word, one makes all their interests one's own... (p. 187) This stage-one marked by strong manifestations of empathycan seldom lead to major analytic advances; it merely prepares the ground. In the second phase-labelled "the resistance against the counter-transference"-the analyst, after painfully learning the countertransference symptoms, risks becoming "too abrupt and repellent towards the patient; this would retard the appearance of the transference, the pre-condition of every successful psychoanalysis" (p. 188). The third segment or phase, "the control of counter-transference," is a hybrid time, both mythical and organic. It is, so to speak, a time segment that breaks out of itself. Here the freely moving libido of the analyst is the main tool of work. as Ferenczi writes: "This constant oscillation between the free play of phantasy and critical scrutiny presupposes freedom and uninhibited motility of psychic excitation on the doctor's part, however, that can hardly ever be demanded in another sphere" (p. 189). In the last phase of analysis, the successful mirror of the analyst's uninhibited motility, will be the "weaning of the libido" (Ferenczi & Rank, 1924 /1925 . In this phase, the patient shows the ability to withdraw libido from the analysis and redirect it outward.
Through attention to segmented time, Ferenczi opens the way to acknowledging a striking inversion: sometimes countertransference precedes transference. analysts, who are considered throughout the entire Clinical Diary as part of a "structure to be erected by two parties" (Haynal, 1999, p. 318) , bring their own transferences that run with, not counter to, the analytic process. The analyst's time is less silent and selfeffacing than we are accustomed to believe; analysis is not a time-free container guiding the patient into the timelessness of the unconscious. It is time-bound in a way that allows the emergence of a horizontal dimension. The analyst and the analysand occupy the same ontological stratum, producing in the words of the Clinical Diary "the impression of two equally terrified children who compare their experiences, and because of their common fate understand each other completely and instinctively try to comfort each other" (1932/1995, p. 56 ). This common time allows for a horizontal therapeutic alliance, in which the analyst is not fixed in the place of the father or mother but travels to the places that the cure demands. But while still emphasizing this alliance, Ferenczi also ascribes differentiated roles to the analyst and analysand. as he argues, the situation of the analyst is similar in many respects to that of the midwife, who as far as possible attempts to remain a mere observer of a natural process until required at critical moments to intervene to aid a birth that is not progressing spontaneously. In his role, the analyst makes an empathic intervention into organic time.
Ferenczi acknowledges that moving forward and backward through segments of time requires an anchor in the present, a "here and now" technique. He and Rank explain in The Development of Psychoanalysis:
The analyst must take into account that almost every expression of his patient springs from several periods, but he must give his chief attention to the present reaction. only from this point of view he can succeed in uncovering the roots of the actual reaction in the past, which means changing the attempts of the patient to repeat into remembering. In this process he need pay little attention to the future. one may quietly leave this care to the person himself who has been sufficiently enlightened about his past and present mental strivings. The historic, cultural and phylogenetic analogies also need, in the most part, not be discussed in the analysis. The patient need hardly ever, and the analyst extremely seldom, occupy himself with this early period. (1924/1925, p. 38) This passage describes austere self-containment within the present; organic time forms the analyst's horizon of selfrestraint. Reflection on historical, cultural, and phylogenetic analogies-on originary time-remains fundamentally a solitary act not shared with the patient in any direct form. again, the psychoanalyst looks at psychic life just as the midwife observes a natural birth. Here the main operations in the economy of the analyst's mind are segmentation, sequencing, and thinking through phases.
Segments drawn in the mind help to anchor the analyst's temporal meta-construction. Stated another way, the discipline required to make sense of transference and to break time apart-in the first instance, in the second instance, in the last instance-combats the illusion of timelessness. We thus find in Ferenczi the first psychoanalyst to voice a phased theory of countertransference and to make consciousness of organic life a vehicle of self-limitation and technical clarification.
Third Thread: Pulsating Time or the Meandering Line
The third thread of time-what I describe as the meandering line-leads to Ferenczi's theory of contertransference. This is a time of pulsations, when the analyst becomes attuned to what Ferenczi in "The elasticity of Psychoanalytic Technique" (1928/1994) describes as the patient's diapason, the capacity to produce or resonate with a pure tone. The diapason expresses Ferenczi's lifelong search for a relational truth, for emotional honesty, openness, and self-disclosure.
Both patient and analyst possess tools of acoustic resonance, a circumstance that helps to explain one of Ferenczi's most highly sophisticated-and most frequently misunderstood-technical propositions: the complementarity of the frustration principle and the relaxation principle. The misunderstanding started with a mis-translation. In his 1928 essay on elasticity, Ferenczi introduced his rule of empathy, bringing with it important modifications to Freud's insistence on frustration, abstinence, and neutrality. When the 1955 english translation of Ferenczi's works referred, however, to the idea of "indulgence" (Ferenczi, 1929 (Ferenczi, /1994 )-a translation of his concept of Nachgiebigkeit-the significance of empathy began to become lost and Ferenczi's analytic style appeared to be a giving in to the analysand's demands. But as arnold Rachman (1998) has explained, Nachgiebigkeit has a strong positive meaning: it does not signify giving in, but rather "a willingness to give to," a flexibility, suppleness, or pliability (p. 65). In other words, the analyst and patient mutually determine the correct pitch of the therapy.
While it is important to retranslate Nachgiebigkeit, it is of even greater importance to recuperate Ferenczi's conception of frustration and relaxation. In his paper on neocatharsis (1929/1994) , the idea of the complementarity between the two represents the crux of his notion of the patient's "economy of suffering" (p. 118). He states with striking clarity: "psychoanalysis employs two opposite methods: it produces heightening of the tension by the frustration it imposes and relaxation by the freedom it allows" (p. 115). Ferenczi's "active technique" is built around the same rhythmic core, and presupposes a productive sequencing of tension and relaxation: "In requiring what is inhibited, and inhibiting what is uninhibited, we hope for a fresh distribution of the patient's psychic, primarily of his libidinal energy that will further the laying bare of the repressed material " (1921b/1994, p. 212) . From this sequence emerges a new time-a pulsating time that resembles a meandering line. This temporal schema reflects a basic vitality of life. like the movement of blood to and from the heart, the analyst's "willingness to give to" alternates with the limitation or prohibition of gratification. a rhythm is thus imprinted in the cure; in fact, the cure is predicated on the rhythmic capacity of the analysis. Ferenczi therefore introduces a kairotic notion of time: both flexibility and restraint must occur at the right time, reacting to the vitalities and the morbidities of the other. Ferenczi's pulsating time is necessarily a time that is responsive to the other: its alternations must be attuned to the patient, composing a "dialogue of unconsciouses" (Ferenczi, 1932 (Ferenczi, /1995 ).
Ferenczi's pulsating time does not derive from an overpowering, enigmatic, or thin notion of intuition. The genesis of this meandering line can be found in Ferenczi's own biographical and clinical inquiries, and in his work with difficult patients (such as elizabeth Severn, his most famous case). In his Clinical Diary, Ferenczi comments: This was the point where I refused to follow him [Freud] . against his will I began to deal openly with questions of technique. I refused to abuse the patients' trust in this way, and neither did I share his idea that therapy was worthless. I believed rather that therapy was good, but perhaps we were still deficient, and I began to look for our errors. In this search I took several false steps; I went too far with Rank, because on one point (the transference situation) he dazzled me with his new insight. I tried to pursue the Freudian technique of frustration honestly and sincerely to the end (active therapy). Following its failure I tried permissiveness and relaxation, again an exaggeration. In the wake of these two defeats, I am working humanely and naturally, with benevolence, and free from personal prejudices, on the acquisition of knowledge that will allow me to help. (1932/1995, p. 186) The humane and natural work to which Ferenczi refers here leads to his third concept of time, orchestrated as undulating temporal moves, when what is inhibited comes to be required and what is unrestrained becomes inhibited. The meandering line demands a special mental hygiene of the analyst; cathexes oscillate between "identification (analytic object-love) on the one hand and self-control or intellectual activity on the other" (Ferenczi, 1928 (Ferenczi, /1994 . What results from sustaining this hygiene is a chain of kairotic emergence and a model of elasticity: being "at the right time" (with the other) allows the other to relive the time of trauma, and learn to be "at the right time" with others in turn. The pulsating time of the analytic setting thus breaks into the pulsating time of the patient's life. as Ferenczi states: "The ideal result of a completed analysis is precisely that elasticity which analytic technique demands of the mental therapist" (p. 99).
achieving this chain of emergence imposes strong exigencies on the analyst. Both frustration and relaxation come with pitfalls, and can be abused. The necessity to pursue them in a productive sequence, leading to a better economy of suffering for the patient, only increases these exigencies. In this matter, Ferenczi conducts himself again without many illusions: I am of course conscious that this twofold method of frustration and indulgence [Nachgiebigkeit in the original] requires from the analyst himself an even greater control than before of counter-transference and counterresistance. It is no uncommon thing for even those teachers and parents who take their task very seriously to be led by imperfectly mastered instincts into excess in either direction. Nothing is easier than to use the principle of frustration in one's relation with patients and children as a cloak for indulgence in one's own unconfessed inclinations. on the other hand, exaggerated forms and quantities of tenderness may subserve one's own, possibly unconscious, libidinal tendencies, rather than the ultimate good of the individual in one's care. (1929/1994, p. 124) Ferenczi's notions of elasticity and active technique build upon his concept of pulsating time or the meandering line. It is a bold Ferenczian temporality, installing the vitality of life-the dyadic rhythm of frustration and relaxation-at the core of analytic technique.
Clinical Vignette: The Cup of Miriam
The following vignette offers an illustration of the role of Ferenczian temporal meta-constructions in therapy. a few weeks after the beginning of analysis, M. announced that she had encountered the "house of her life." The building was more than one hundred years old, and it was heavy with traces of the turbulent european century. at the time of the Second World War, the house belonged to a Jewish woman who was deported and killed in auschwitz. M. embarked on a process of reconstructing the history of the house, bringing to the surface the suffering and displacement of her own family during the war, as well as raising unanswered questions about her possible, hidden Jewish origin. The search to confirm this history became an important occasion for mourning and triggered memories aimed at establishing the authenticity of Raluca Soreanu belonging. Yet, certainty of Jewish origin failed to materialize. The longing to recover her location in history and her family story persisted. Her loss could not be mourned fully.
When the time of M.'s finding a house crossed the traumatic time of the Holocaust, a significant event happened in the psychoanalytic session. The analyst stood up suddenly and gave M. a Jewish ceremonial cup that had belonged to a member of her own family. The sequence of gestures-standing up, reaching for the cup, handing the cup, and sharing an element of family history-counted as a sort of stumbling: together, the therapist and M., as individuals and as an analytical pair, stumbled over a fragment of history. a cup previously owned became temporarily (during the time of the session) re-owned, initiating a new cycle of symbolization. as we see here, it is not only words that slip but also hands on objects, on a ritual cup. There transpired a full Ferenczian walk from the literality of words-"here is the cup"-to the symbolic load of matter-the cup, actually there, makes a striking invitation beyond itself. M. held the cup throughout the rest of the session, returning it to the analyst only at the end, when it was put once more in its place. During the session, the weight of the need for facts in reconstituting the family story lifted. Despite untraceable details, despite uncertainty, even across the brokenness of a linear story line, loss could be mourned more fully. Not knowing became more bearable. M. touched an object of the past, but with it, she touched the past as well.
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This tactile experience had several reverberations. More than two years after the handing of the cup, M. associated it to the myth of Miriam, a tangent to an ancestral past. Miriam, the sister of Moses and aaron, fulfilled a distinctive role in passing on God's word. Moses communicated with God, but was unable to speak without stuttering. aaron, acting as an intermediary between God and the Jewish people, made the words of Moses more clearly discernible. Miriam was a creator: she gave form to the words of Moses in poetry and song. Her voice resonated with natural forces; she could make water spring from dry ground by merely singing and used her gift during the crossing of the desert. according to legend, on the second day of creation, a well was made for those who had need of water while journeying through the desert and who were worthy of such a divine gift. Miriam received the well, and after her death, the well was said to have dried up. a contemporary ritual called Kos Miryam (cup of Miriam) by the women who invented it in the early 1970s centers on the symbolic re-appropriation of a vessel containing waters from Miriam's well. During the ritual, women pass a cup from one to the other, preserving the remembrance of the ancestral well that gave water to those crossing the desert and thus reinvigorating the tradition. as adelman (1986, 1994) explains, themes that run through the folklore on Miriam include those of birth, water, creativity, innovation, risk-taking, and celebration.
What does it mean to pass on a container? It is a risky and paradoxical gesture that disturbs the dichotomy active/passive and confers a sense of mutuality on the analytic setting and analytic relationship. To hand over a container means that the container, apart from performing its "holding" role, will itself need to be held or supported, in all its enigmatic weight. The ritual cup becomes central to a cycle of symbolization: it is given; it is held; it is retrieved. It functions as a material metaphor, as a "third space" (J. Benjamin, 1988) between the analyst and the analysand.
Polyphonies of time run through the handing of the cup. a strong tangent was drawn when the analysand associated the episode with the myth of Miriam. ancestral time is not only pre-catastrophic, as Ferenczi might argue, but it encompasses concentric containments: a cup, within a cup, within another cup. This concentricity invites a new psychoanalytic language, one that allows us to envisage intergenerational transmissions, and even more particularly, generosities between women. as adrienne Rich wrote in Of Woman Born (1976) , "Until a strong line of love, confirmation, and example stretches from mother to daughter, from woman to woman across the generations, women will still be wandering in the wilderness" (p. 246). The myth of Jocasta has perhaps exhausted its creativities as a reference in psychoanalysis for construing women and femininity; the encounter with Miriam, therefore, is refreshing. This feminine orpheus-who makes nature resonate, who accomplishes her work by the powers of her voice, who creates poetry and song, and who is endowed with both a passive and active generativity-is indeed captivating. If Jocasta is the invitation to not questioning and not knowing, Miriam stands for the continual reinvention of tradition. She does not turn against her legacies but uses them for creating new form.
The second Ferenczian time-the segmented, phased conception of transference and countertransference-was also present with the cup. as this event occurred toward the beginning of the analysis, the analyst's identification with the patient's pain was especially strong. elements of a shared history were allowed to function as grounds for a therapeutic alliance.
Finally, the third Ferenczian time pulsated within the framework as well. The passive/active act of giving a container intervened in a heightened moment of tension, when several threads of traumatic time were condensed in M.'s discourse. By not being afraid to give, the analyst lowered the tension, orchestrating a Ferenczian moment of relaxation that enabled a differentiation of the threads of traumatic time. M. acknowledged more of her psychic pain and discerned more traces of historical trauma. To touch those times in one moment was a political act in its widest sense. With it, there appeared a fragment of all times that ever were, and a flickering trace of innumerable times to come. Bateson, 1987) . For Bateson, metaphor involves the operations of homology, empathy, and abduction, allowing one to gain access to the pattern that connects different strata of reality. 5. In Á la recherche du temps perdu, Marcel Proust revised Bergson's notion of selective memory by introducing involuntary memory, which is encountered through contingency. Stumbling over the smell of a Madeleine cake, a memory of growing up in combray comes to the fore. For Walter Benjamin (1973) , involuntary memory is not willed but is encountered through a shock or surprise.
Notes

